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Article 6

Is representative democracy worthwhile? Not really, Oliver Arnold
suggests in The Third Citizen. In
this painstaking, lively, and piercing book, the author makes his case
not with reference to the present
The Third Citizen: Shakespeare’s
moment but by attending to the
Theater and the Early Modern House
rhetoric of the House of Commons
of Commons by Oliver Arnold.
and to Shakespeare’s attitudes toBaltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
ward it. Arnold believes his apUniversity Press, 2007. Pp. 325.
proach needful for several reasons,
$55.00 cloth.
ones that begin as disciplinary concerns, then ramify outward. One
reason is the continued influence
of New Historicism and its focus
on “the subjectivity, ideology, and
culture peculiar to monarchy” (25).
Another is the tendency of revisionist historians to accord the
early modern Commons a passive
role, that of a mere department of
the crown. A third is the practice
of “new Whig” critics who refute
new historicists and revisionist historians alike by shifting focus from
the crown to the people who opposed it in hopes of protoliberal
empowerment.
For Arnold, all three approaches—emphasizing as they do the
political hierarchy’s top or bottom—neglect a crucially important
discourse that was emerging within
the Commons and that articulates
what the author calls “the politics
of representation.” To be sure,
Elizabethan and Jacobean knights
and burgesses were elected to their
seats in the Commons as were generations of previous members of
Parliament (MPs), but the notion
that MPs represented the people,
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Arnold points out, was novel: “the
claims [MPs] made to represent
and speak for thousands of people
were ‘modern’ and unprecedented”
(15). In focusing on the words of
monarchs and the commonwealth’s
members but not of members of
parliament, historians and literary
critics alike have largely ignored a
concept of artificial personhood—
according to which an MP speaks
not just for himself but for and
even as the people—that was born
in Shakespeare’s time and is integral to our thinking about representative democracy today.
Arnold sees Shakespeare adopting a radical position on representative politics. Arnold argues that
“[t]he Whigs’ attempt to make
Shakespeare our liberal contemporary” (11) is misguided—not
because Shakespeare was an absolutist, or regarded the English
people with contempt, or was a republican rather than a true democrat, but because he portrays
political representation as itself
tragic. This is so because being
represented deforms and disempowers the enfranchised subject,
who is asked to hold a number of
counterintuitive, crippling beliefs:
for example, “that he was representatively present at the political
center (that he was at once home
in Shropshire and present in St.
Stephen’s Chapel in London),”
“that he empowered himself by
empowering others,” and “that he
attained a political voice by allowing others to speak for him” (7).

Shakespeare rejects each of these
beliefs: “In Shakespeare’s canon,”
Arnold writes, “there is not a single exception to this rule: when
they invest representatives with
their voices, the people lose both
power and their capacity to articulate cogently their aims and desires” (12). In speaking for and
even as the people, political representatives make those people disappear (13). Arnold believes that
his turn to the birth of
representational rhetoric—and especially to Shakespeare’s critique
of it—is particularly timely, for we
now take that rhetoric for granted:
“[E]arly modern observers,” Arnold writes, “. . . may have something disquieting to tell us, the
subjects of a representationalism
so entrenched as to seem virtually
natural and inevitable.” Sharing in
Shakespeare’s wisdom, we might
see how sinister this entrenchment
is, might “consider whether the
most fundamental contradictions
and ideological misrecognitions of
political representation in its primitive form have been exorcised
from, or simply work more effectively in, its perfected form” (19).
The Third Citizen opens with a
lengthy introduction followed by a
full chapter that focuses—largely
through parliamentary proceedings—on the self-conception of the
House of Commons, then moves
into chapter-length readings of the
First Tetralogy, Titus Andronicus
and The Rape of Lucrece, Julius
Caesar, and, lastly, Coriolanus. Each

ON OLIVER ARNOLD’S THE THIRD CITIZEN
chapter takes extended recourse to
historical materials, and the contexts in which Arnold charts
Shakespeare’s tragedies of political
representation are many, including
the experience of parliamentary
“elections”; disciplinary practices
of the House of Commons (which
claimed to be the mouth of laypeople but excluded them from
meetings and kept proceedings
completely secret); and theories of
parliamentary representation, of
the magic by which the absent people were made present. The book
thus has a broad appeal; it should
be of interest not just to Shakespeareans but also to the legions of
historians and literary critics who
study the Commons and its relationship to the rise of English
republicanism.
By and large, readers will be not
just interested but compelled. With
admirable precision and subtlety,
Arnold pairs the politics articulated
by MPs with Shakespeare’s demystifications of them, often also with
recourse to the bard’s rewriting of
classical sources. For example, Arnold explains nicely how, in Titus,
Shakespeare revises Livy, for whom
republicanism is the remedy to
Tarquinism and to rape; Arnold
argues that “to be represented in
Titus’s Rome is not to gain a voice
in state affairs but to lose one’s
tongue” and that “muteness is the
shared condition of the victim of
rape and the victims of political
representation,” which makes untenable distinctions between the
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emperor Saturninus and more
recognizably republican figures
such as Marcus Andronicus (101).
Equally compelling are similar arguments about Brutus’s arrogation
of the people in Julius Caesar and
the founding of the tribunate in
Coriolanus, which “marks a radical
transformation—and not for the
better—in the people’s comportment, manner of speech, and
self-conception” (96). The Roman
citizens of that play, mistakenly
giving up their voices, are changed from “smart and confident”
individuals into a disempowered,
“fickle and confused rabble” (96).
Arnold even demonstrates how we,
still buying into the rhetoric first
deployed by the Commons, make
some of the same mistakes as
Shakespeare’s characters; for instance, Whig recuperations of the
play, “for all the importance they
attach to plebeian speech, do not
distinguish between speaking for
oneself and being spoken for by
representatives,” and in doing so
such recuperations “construct political representation precisely as the
ideology of early modern political
representation constructs political
representation” (195). This seems
exactly right, and to the extent that
speaking for oneself and being spoken for are conflated not just in
some contemporary criticism but in
contemporary culture—conflation
that, given the most recent presidential election, seems fairly blatant
here in academia—Arnold’s book
supplies a crucially important,
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clarifying reminder about representative democracy’s limits.
The book is perhaps not as fully
developed when it comes to
describing what Shakespeare offers as an alternative to the politics
of representation and that politics’
emptying out of the represented.
The alternative, it turns out, is a
somewhat vague, undertheorized
notion of “empowered” selfhood
that is arguably as suspect as some
of the notions for which he takes
Whig critics to task. Arnold
opposes representational politics to
a “radically public theater” in
which people hold onto their
power; Arnold believes that we
can see the benefits of this most
clearly when Caesar refuses to take
the crown offered him by Antony,
the people celebrate, and Caesar
must thus refuse the crown twice
more (42). Here, the people retain
their “power to judge and decide,
to turn their thumbs up or down,”
just as theatrical audiences did (43).
For this reason Shakespeare, and
Arnold along with him, think of
theater as “a model for genuinely
democratic relations of power,” for
a politics of presence in which the
people retain their “will and their
right to judge their own enemies”
(144). So for all that Arnold speaks
of Shakespeare as a radical not
simply for his time but for our
own, one main difference between
his Shakespeare and that of the
Whigs is between one who favors
some version of participatory
democracy and one who favors its

representative counterpart. People
should participate directly in government rather than be represented in it; they should be truly
empowered and truly protected by
their governments, their rational
capacities respected and their
voices given regard.
Another way to say this is that
for Arnold as for Whigs—indeed,
for most historians and literary
critics invested in recuperating
English republicanism for the present moment—a bounded, discrete,
delineated, protoliberal form of individuality is an assumed political
good. Arnold speaks of “a tragic
loss of integrated identity”; Shakespeare believes that people must
“retain their power rather than
delegate their authority to others”
(41, 160). Arnold admires the same
thing that Whigs do about the
citizens of Coriolanus—their “audacity and self-possession,” their
capacity, early in the play, to be “an
articulate, deliberative, and purposeful group of distinct individuals” (215, 204). Consider the
mournful tone with which Arnold
regards self-loss as the citizens experience it, once in the introduction
and again in the epilogue:
When they give up their
assault on the Capitol in exchange for the creation of the
tribunate, they transform a
power proper to themselves
into a power that can only be
exercised by others . . . with
the steps to the Capitol itself

ON OLIVER ARNOLD’S THE THIRD CITIZEN
right before them, with power
just at their fingertips, the
citizens turn fortune’s wheel
with their own hands and
cast themselves down before
masters of their own creation.
What makes the Third Citizen’s loss of power so moving . . . is the concomitant loss
of the capacity to articulate
loss and, perhaps, even the
loss of a selfhood sufficiently
integrated to register loss as
loss. (10)
What name, then, should we
give to the dramatic fate of
the Third Citizen, who, when
we meet him in act I, is in possession of himself and, perhaps, on the brink of wresting
power from the patricians but
who soon believes that he can
win honor only by recognizing honor in others, that he
can ennoble himself only by
conferring nobility on others,
that he can make his voice
heard only by letting others
speak for him, that he can be
powerful only by making him
powerless? (220)
Certainly, having his voice usurped
by sinister tribunes is not a nice way
for the Third Citizen to be deprived
of power. Still, any number of theorists will wonder to what degree we
can call Arnold’s Shakespeare “radical.” This Shakespeare is strongly
attached to bounded selfhood and
strongly opposed to vulnerability;
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this Shakespeare urges individuals
to seize the “power just at their fingertips.” Imagine the exception
that would be taken by Judith Butler, Leo Bersani, Jean Luc-Nancy,
Giorgio Agamben, and the host of
others who do not regard “holding
onto power” as inherently good and
who see as many salutary forms of
vulnerability, of letting go of power,
as pernicious ones. These theorists
also emphasize how holding onto
power can itself be pernicious, and
they might even look to Arnold’s
characterization of Caesar’s body—
how Romans might have judged
him were he an enemy—as symptomatic of the dangers of empowered selfhood: “Caesar’s fragile,
mortal, vulnerable body . . . reminds the people of the power they
once enjoyed in relation to Caesar,”
Arnold writes. “The body they see
before them is the body that Caesar
offered to them after the thwarted
crowning. The ‘piteous spectacle,’
in other words, is, in part, the
spectacle of the violence that was
properly theirs usurped. Caesar
was once theirs to kill” (175). If
Caesar being theirs to kill is the
alternative to their being dissolved
by Brutus, it is difficult to see how
“holding onto power” would be
much more than a false—or rather
a literalized—alternative to the violence of political representation,
just as tribunes are elsewhere
shown to be a false alternative to
tyrants.
Even more: we can read the
texts on which Arnold focuses not
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only as rejecting the possibility of
preserving bounded selves when
representing them, but as abandoning bounded, protoliberal selfhood altogether. These texts ask
that vulnerability be embraced. In
Coriolanus, for example, we might
see this in the eponymous hero’s
giving over of himself to Aufidius
and to death. There are, as well,
ways to see a republican politics
founded in the salutary sharing of,
rather than the defensive attempt
to eradicate, that vulnerability, and
it is at least arguable that Shakespeare’s gestures in such directions
are more radical than the gestures
that Arnold deems the bard’s most
radical: those pitched toward the
demystifications of representationalism and toward the empowerment that such political clarity
might effect. Nevertheless, Shakespeare’s refusal of a politics to which
many of us still subscribe is striking
indeed, and Arnold is right to say so
and to show us how; the brilliance
of the book resides in precisely this.
—Case Western Reserve
University

